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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants, American Flint Glass Workers Union, 
AFL-CIO, Michael Sine, and Andy J. Hatfield (collectively the 
"Union"), appeal an order of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania denying their motion for 
summary judgment and, instead, sua sponte granting summary 
judgment to the appellees, the Beaumont Glass Company (the 
"Company") and the Beaumont Company Pension Plan for Hourly 
Employees (the "Plan").  This case arose after the Company 
unilaterally adopted a resolution to terminate the Plan, 
believing that termination would leave a surplus for 
distribution.  The Union objected to the Company's unilateral 
decision to terminate and filed a charge with the National Labor 
Relations Board (the "NLRB").  Subsequently the Company and the 
Union agreed in writing to permit the termination process to go 
forward and the Union withdrew the charge. 
 After the Company and the Union had so agreed, the 
Company learned that there would be no surplus on termination, 
that the Plan was underfunded and that it would have to 
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contribute approximately $300,000 to the Plan before the Internal 
Revenue Service (the "IRS") would approve termination. 
The Company then decided not to terminate, and the Union filed 
this action alleging that the agreement to proceed with 
termination precluded the Company from canceling or withdrawing 
its decision to terminate because of unanticipated cost.  Rather, 
the Union contends that the Company must provide the additional 
funds needed for IRS approval of the Plan's termination.  It 
advances, as alternative theories of recovery, the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA") and the common law of contracts. 
 We reject the Union's theory that the Company had a 
fiduciary duty to provide the funds necessary to terminate the 
Plan.  On the Union's contract theory, however, we conclude that 
genuine disputed issues of material fact exist.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the district court's sua sponte order granting 
summary judgment to the Company and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I.  Statement of Facts 
 On July 2, 1992, the Company's board of directors 
adopted a resolution to terminate the Plan.0  It also amended the 
                     
0The resolution provided: 
 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the 
attached Amendment to the Plan which, among 
other things, ceases any future Retirement 
Benefit accruals under the Plan effective 
August 31, 1992, be, and the same hereby is, 
adopted; 
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Plan to provide for an August 31, 1992 termination date.0  The 
                                                                  
 
FURTHER RESOLVED that the Plan shall be 
terminated as of August 31, 1992; 
 
FURTHER RESOLVED that all liabilities of the 
Plan to participants, beneficiaries and 
alternate payees be discharged through the 
purchase of annuity contracts, or the payment 
of lump sum distributions to electing 
participants, for all persons other than 
those who may receive lump sum cash-outs of 
$3,500 or less; . . . 
 
FURTHER RESOLVED, that [corporate officers] 
. . . file with the appropriate federal 
agencies such notifications and ruling 
requests as are customary or desirable under 
the circumstances. 
 
Appendix ("App.") at 22. 
0The following amendments were adopted by the board of directors: 
 
1.  The Pension Fund and the Trustee, 
Article VI is amended by the addition of the 
following paragraph at the end thereof: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this Plan, contributions under 
the Plan shall cease as of 
August 31, 1992. 
 
2.  Eligibility Service and Credited Service, 
Article II, is amended by the addition of the 
following paragraph at the end thereof: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this Plan, Eligibility Service 
and Credited Service shall cease to 
accrue, for any participant, no 
later than August 31, 1992. 
 
3.  Retirement Benefits, Article VI, is 
amended by the addition of the following 
paragraph at the end thereof: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision 
in the Plan, Retirement Benefits 
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Plan, as so amended, remains in effect.  On July 2, 1992, the 
Company delivered notice of its intent to terminate the Plan on 
August 31, 1992 to each participant, beneficiary, alternate 
payee, and the Union pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a)(2) (West 
1985).  Based upon its own consultants' reports, the Company then 
believed that the Plan's assets exceeded the present value of its 
liabilities. 
 About a week after receiving notice of the Company's 
intent to terminate the Plan, the Union filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the NLRB challenging the Company's 
unilateral decision to terminate the Plan.  The NLRB issued a 
complaint and scheduled a hearing before an administrative law 
judge.  Before the hearing, the Company and the Union met and 
entered into an agreement meant to resolve their dispute.  In 
exchange for the Union's withdrawal of the NLRB charge, the 
Company agreed to pay the Plan's participants a lump-sum cash 
payment upon "receipt of approval of the Plan termination by the 
IRS."0  The parties refer to this agreement as the "Settlement 
Agreement," and so will we. 
                                                                  
shall cease to accrue, for any 
participant, no later than 
August 31, 1992. 
 
App. at 21. 
0In this respect, the Settlement Agreement states: 
 
 Upon receipt of the approval of the plan 
termination by the Internal Revenue Service, 
the Company will arrange for the distribution 
of the actuarial equivalent value of the 
accrued benefits in cash for each plan 
participant entitled to benefits under the 
7 
 The Company's consultants began preparing the documents 
necessary for regulatory permission to terminate the Plan.  In 
doing so, they discovered that the Plan's assets were 
insufficient to satisfy its liabilities on a termination basis, 
even though it was adequately funded on an on-going basis. 
Instead of the expected surplus, the Company now faced a deficit 
of approximately $300,000 if it proceeded to terminate the Plan.0 
If termination was abandoned, however, the Plan would remain 
adequately funded, so long as the Company continued its customary 
required contributions.  Knowing these facts, the Company 
notified the Union that the assets of the Plan were insufficient 
to permit termination and that it no longer intended to terminate 
the Plan.  The Company also refused to submit a termination plan 
                                                                  
terminating plan, unless such participant 
elects to take their benefits in the form of 
a monthly benefit. 
 
App. at 24. 
0Apparently, pension funding on a termination basis is subject to 
actuarial assumptions that differ from those used to calculate 
funding on an on-going basis.  Accordingly, a pension plan that 
is adequately funded on an on-going basis can be substantially 
underfunded on a termination basis.  The consultants explained 
the situation with regards to the present plan as follows: 
 
To summarize, the Plan has been caught in 
something of a squeeze between adverse 
changes in the annuity market place and 
adverse asset growth at the same time.  The 
result is that the Plan's assets, which once 
comfortably covered all termination 
liabilities, no longer meet that need.  The 
assets are, however, certainly large enough 
to meet the current annual payout 
requirements for retired employees. . . . 
 
App. at 201.   
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to the IRS, contending that the Settlement Agreement imposes on 
it no legal obligation to terminate. 
 The Union then filed this action.  It alleged that the 
Company breached the Settlement Agreement and ERISA by failing to 
terminate the Plan and pay its participants the lump sum benefits 
that they would be entitled to receive upon termination.  When 
the facts recited above went undisputed, the Union moved for 
summary judgment, contending that the Settlement Agreement 
unambiguously required the Company to terminate the Plan and pay 
the lump sums due on termination. 
 On May 13, 1994, the district court held that the 
Company and the Plan were not obligated to terminate by contract, 
fiduciary duty, or any other legal principle.  It reasoned that 
ERISA precluded termination of an underfunded plan and therefore 
"submission of the Plan termination to the IRS for approval would 
have been an exercise in futility."  American Flint Glass Workers 
Union, AFL-CIO v. Beaumont Glass Co., No. 93-1511, slip op. at 6 
(W.D. Pa. May 13, 1994).  It also concluded that the Settlement 
Agreement did not obligate the Company to make the payment 
necessary to fund termination.  The district court not only 
denied the Union's motion for summary judgment but, on its own 
motion, granted summary judgment to the Company.  The Union filed 
this timely appeal. 
 
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1995).  We have 
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appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final decision 
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
 In this case, the Company did not move for summary 
judgment.  The district court, on its own motion, granted summary 
judgment, stating: 
Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not 
explicitly authorize this Court to grant 
summary judgment to a non-moving party, the 
Court concludes that 'where one party has 
invoked the power of the court to render a 
summary judgment against [an] adversary, it 
is reasonable that this invocation gives the 
court power to render summary judgment for 
[the] adversary if it is clear that the case 
warrants that result.'  6 Moore's Federal 
Practice ¶ 56.12 (1994). 
 
 
American Flint, No. 93-1511, slip op. at 9.  Neither party 
challenges the district court's decision to act sua sponte.0  We 
will therefore review the merits of the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to the Company using the customary 
standard of plenary review over district court orders granting 
summary judgment.  Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health-Welfare 
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993); Wheeler v. Towanda Area 
School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).  All reasonable 
                     
0Nevertheless, it is appropriate to remind the district court: 
"[A] district court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte 
unless the court gives notice and an opportunity to oppose 
summary judgment."  Otis Elevator Co. v. George Washington Hotel 
Corp., 27 F.3d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing, among other 
cases, Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 
(3d Cir. 1990), Davis Elliott International, Inc. v. Pan American 
Container Corp., 705 F.2d 705, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1983).  While 
these rights can be waived, orders granting summary judgment sua 
sponte endanger important rights and, unless waived as here, are 
likely to result in judicial inefficiency and deprivation to the 
rights of one of the parties. 
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inferences and any ambiguities should be drawn in favor of the 
party against whom judgment is sought.  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 
1297-98.  Moreover, summary judgment should be granted only when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 1297. 
 
III.  Discussion 
A.  ERISA 
 The Union claims that the Company breached its 
fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to terminate the Plan. 
Conceding that the Company had no initial duty to terminate, the 
Union claims that once the Company amended the Plan to include a 
termination date it had to administer the Plan in accordance with 
that amendment.  Thus, the Union concludes that the Company 
breached its fiduciary duty when it failed to provide the funding 
necessary to terminate the Plan and thereafter distribute the 
Plan's assets to the employees.  On this point we, like the 
district court, disagree with the Union. 
 The Plan is a single-employer defined benefit pension 
plan subject to ERISA, and the Company serves as a fiduciary 
under ERISA with regard to certain specified plan related 
decisions.  Although "ERISA creates a fiduciary duty on the part 
of an employer administering a plan," the employer does not 
always act in a fiduciary capacity.  Delgrosso v. Spang and Co., 
769 F.2d 928, 934 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 
(1986).  Under ERISA, "when employers themselves serve as plan 
administrators, they assume fiduciary status only when and to the 
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extent that they function in their capacity as plan 
administrators, not when they conduct business that is not 
regulated by ERISA."  Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 
1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted).  An employer's 
decision to amend a plan is not the subject of ERISA's fiduciary 
duties.  Id. at 1161 ("Virtually every circuit has rejected the 
proposition that ERISA's fiduciary duties attach to an employer's 
decision whether or not to amend an employee benefit plan.") 
(collecting cases); see also McGath v. Auto-Body North Shore, 
Inc., 7 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hozier). 
 A decision to terminate a plan is "unconstrained by the 
fiduciary duties that ERISA imposes on plan administration." 
Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1162; see also Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 
(1993).  Payonk v. HMW Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 229 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  We will, however, assume, once a termination 
decision is reached, that ERISA's fiduciary duties control the 
termination procedures.  See District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 550, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(holding that post-termination decisions are subject to ERISA's 
fiduciary duties when they involve discretionary decisions). 
 Nevertheless, we believe that the Union's fiduciary 
claim still fails in this case.  The duty here in question is no 
more than the duty to administer an ERISA-covered plan in 
accordance with the plan's terms.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (West 
1985 and Supp. 1995); Spang, 769 F.2d at 935-36.  ERISA 
section 1104 states in relevant part: 
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[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of 
the participants and beneficiaries and-- 
* * * 
(D) in accordance with the documents and 
instruments governing the plan insofar as 
such documents and instruments are consistent 
with the provisions of this subchapter and 
subchapter III of this chapter. 
 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). 
The Union's argument ignores the highlighted limiting clause in 
this quote from the statute, which limits the Company's fiduciary 
duty in effecting termination to compliance with ERISA's 
provisions concerning termination.  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held, "strict compliance 
with the statute is the sole means by which a pension plan 
subject to the provisions of ERISA may be terminated."  Phillips 
v. Bebber, 914 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1990); see also 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1341(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) ("Exclusive means of plan 
termination"). 
 With respect to termination, ERISA provides, ". . . a 
single-employer plan may be terminated only in a standard 
termination under subsection (b) of this section or a distress 
termination under subsection (c) of this section."  29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1341(a)(1).  The termination at issue in this case can proceed 
only as a standard termination.  In a standard termination, ERISA 
requires, in relevant part, that: 
the plan administrator shall send a notice to 
the [Pension Guaranty Corporation] setting 
forth-- 
(i) certification by an enrolled actuary-- 
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(I) of the projected amount of the assets of 
the plan (as of the proposed date of the 
final distribution of assets), 
(II) of the actuarial present value (as of 
such date) of the benefit liabilities 
(determined as of the proposed termination 
date) under the plan, and 
(III) that the plan is projected to be 
sufficient (as of such proposed date of final 
distribution) for such benefit liabilities. 
 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1341(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) ("Termination 
procedure").  Here, the actuaries were unable to provide the 
certification required for termination because of insufficient 
assets.  Thus, the Company could not terminate the Plan as the 
amendment provided in accord with ERISA unless it had some legal 
obligation to provide all the funds necessary to meet ERISA's 
full funding requirement.  We perceive no such obligation in the 
statute itself.  Indeed the Union's reasoning on this point seems 
circular.0 
 The Pension Guaranty Corporation's regulations on 
terminations provide: 
[F]ailure to distribute assets . . . within 
the 180-day distribution period . . . shall 
                     
0The Union's reliance on Kinek v. Paramount Communications, 22 
F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 1994), and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. 
Artra, Group, Inc., 972 F.2d 771, 772 (7th Cir. 1992), is 
misplaced.  In Kinek, the court addressed the contractual 
responsibilities of an employer that terminated a plan.  The 
contract in question specifically stated that "'the Employer will 
fully fund'" the plan upon termination.  Kinek, 22 F.3d at 506. 
Although this case may prove relevant on remand to the Union's 
contract claim, it has no effect on its claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  In Artra, the court held an employer liable for 
terminating an underfunded plan.  Artra, 972 F.2d at 771.  
Furthermore, Artra addressed the company's statutory liability 
under ERISA's termination provision, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362, and not 
its fiduciary duties. 
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nullify the termination.  All actions taken 
to effect the plan's termination shall be 
null and void, and the plan shall be an 
ongoing plan.  In this event, the plan 
administrator shall notify the affected 
parties in writing . . . that the plan is not 
going to terminate or, if applicable, that 
the termination was invalid but a new notice 
of intent to terminate is being issued. 
 
 
29 C.F.R. § 2617.28 (emphasis added).  As stated above, the 
Company properly notified the affected parties when it determined 
that the Plan's asserts were insufficient to permit the 
termination process to go forward.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the amendment is null and void and the Company has no continuing 
fiduciary duty to act in accordance with it. 
 The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Company on the Union's breach of fiduciary duty claim will 
be affirmed. 
 
B.  Contract 
 We must still consider, however, what the Settlement 
Agreement obligates the Company to do.  The Union argues that the 
Company promised "to terminate the Plan and, by clear implication 
and by law, to provide whatever funding termination required." 
Brief of Appellant at 8.  The Company responds that ERISA 
precludes it from terminating the Plan at its current funding 
level and nothing in the Settlement Agreement obligates it to 
furnish the additional funding needed to terminate. 
 The Settlement Agreement, as an agreement between an 
employer and a union, is a labor agreement, but its 
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interpretation is nevertheless governed by general principles of 
contract law.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West 1995); Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 508 F.2d 687, 703 n.45 (3d Cir. 1975) (labor agreements 
"are to be interpreted according to principles of general 
contract law inasmuch as Congress has not adopted a different 
standard by which the . . . agreement is to be interpreted."); 
see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 
U.S. 448 (1957). 
 The parties frame their dispute around the Settlement 
Agreement's provision for distributions to Plan participants upon 
the IRS's approval of termination.  The Company contends that the 
IRS's approval is a condition precedent to termination that it is 
unable to satisfy.  The Union argues that the lack of the IRS's 
approval is immaterial because it was the Company's failure to 
submit a termination Plan to the IRS that prevented the 
occurrence of the condition.  See Davidson & Jones Dev. Co. v. 
Elmore Dev. Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1351 (6th Cir. 1991); Vanadium 
Corp. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 
1947); Cauff, Lippman & Co. v. Apogee Finance Group, Inc., 807 
F. Supp. 1007, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 Both parties seem to miss the point when they cast 
their arguments primarily in terms of conditions precedent.0  The 
issue, as we see it, is whether the Settlement Agreement imposes 
                     
0In doing so, they run the risk of confusing the condition 
precedent that the IRS imposes on termination with the provisions 
of the contract that the Company believes make pre-existing full 
funding a condition precedent to its obligation to terminate. 
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a duty on the Company to provide the funding needed to obtain IRS 
approval of the proposed termination.  In this respect, the 
district court correctly defined the issue, but incorrectly 
resolved it.  It held:  "[The Union's] breach of contract theory 
founders because [it] fail[s] to establish that [the Company and 
the Plan] are, or ever were, under a contractual duty to [the 
Union] to put sufficient additional assets into the fund to 
render the fund susceptible of lawful voluntary termination." 
American Flint, No. 93-1511, slip op. at 6.  We hold that the 
district court erred in resolving this issue as a matter of law. 
 "'[I]n order for us to affirm the district court with 
respect to summary judgment, we must determine that the contract 
is so clear that it can be read only one way.'"  Tigg Corp. v. 
Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 605 F.2d 75, 79 (3d 
Cir. 1979)).  Thus, if the union "'presents us with a reasonable 
reading of the contract which varies from that adopted by the 
district court, then a question of fact as to the meaning of the 
contract exists which can only be resolved at trial.'"  Id. 
 In determining the meaning of the contract, the 
"initial resort should be to the 'four corners' of the agreement 
itself."  Washington Hospital v. White, 889 F.2d 1294, 1300 (3d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990).  "To be 
unambiguous, an agreement must be reasonably capable of only one 
construction."  Id. at 1301 (citations omitted).  Ambiguity is a 
pure question of law for the court.  World-Wide Rights Ltd. 
Partnership v. Combe Inc., 955 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1992); see 
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also International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, etc. v. Local 
Lodge D504, 866 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 
(1989); Tigg, 822 F.2d at 362. 
 In deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, a court 
does not just ask whether the language is clear; instead it 
"hear[s] the proffer of the parties and determine[s] if there are 
objective indicia that, from the linguistic reference point of 
the parties, the terms of the contract are susceptible of 
different meanings."  Teamster Industrial Employees Welfare Fund 
v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 
F.2d 1274, 1284 (3d Cir. 1991)) (internal brackets and quotation 
marks omitted).  As we have stated: 
An ambiguous contract is one capable of being 
understood in more senses than one; an 
agreement obscure in meaning through 
indefiniteness of expression, or having a 
double meaning. . . .  Before it can be said 
that no ambiguity exists, it must be 
concluded that the questioned words or 
language are capable of [only] one 
interpretation. 
 
 
Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assurance, 605 F.2d 75, 80 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gerhart v. 
Henry Disston & Sons, 290 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1961)). 
 If a contract can reasonably be interpreted in two 
different ways, neither contracting party is entitled to summary 
judgment.  Here the parties offer two reasonable interpretations: 
(1) the contract requires the Company to terminate the Plan only 
if its current funds enable it to do so, or (2) the contract 
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requires the Company to take all necessary steps (including 
funding) to effectuate the proposed termination.  In this 
respect, the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous and extrinsic 
evidence is necessary to ascertain the intent of the parties. See 
World-Wide Rights, 955 F.2d at 242; Rolls-Royce, 989 F.2d at 135; 
Tigg, 822 F.2d at 363; Thompson-Starrett Int'l, Inc. v. Tropic 
Plumbing, Inc., 457 F.2d 1349, 1352 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 Accordingly, we hold that a material issue of fact 
remains in dispute concerning the parties' intent to impose on 
the Company a duty to provide the funding needed to secure IRS 
approval of termination.0  This question cannot be resolved as a 
matter of law on the record now before us, and therefore further 
proceedings will be needed in the district court. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the above reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Company and 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
                     
0This issue of fact concerning the intent of the contracting 
parties should be distinguished from the legal issue of 
construing the meaning of a contract's terms from their text. See 
White, 889 F.2d at 1302. 
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